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CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR
BRUCE A. ACKERMAN and WILLIAM :. HASSLER
New Haven and London, England: Yale University Press. 1981. Pp. 193. $5.95.
In Clean Coal/Dirty Air, Bruce A. Ackerman and William Hassler
focus upon a crucial substantive policy issue: the future of the coal-
burning power plant in the United States. Ackerman and Hassler an-
alyze EPA's attempt to control the generation and discharge of SO 2
from coal-burning power plants; they argue that it should be taken as
largely indicative of the way our institutions are coping with the crit-
ical environmental trade-offs generated by the energy crisis. A story
is told of how our legal culture composed of Congress, executive
agencies, the courts, and interest groups (eastern high sulfur coal and
environmental citizen interest groups) interacted to require full
scrubbing of coal over the cheaper, but "homely" alternative of phy-
sically washing coal.
The book is informative and well-written; it significantly expands
our understanding of how institutions affect critical environmental
decisions. The story clearly invites cynicism of interest group democ-
racy: Clean Coal/Dirty Air concludes "that Congress's well-inten-
tioned effort to improve the administrative process has driven EPA to
an extraordinary decision that will cost the public tens of billions of
dollars to achieve environmental goals that could be reached more
cheaply, more quickly, and more surely by other means." The authors
argue for an approach in which ambient air quality goals are specified
in terms of monitored improvements over a time frame and the exec-
utive agencies are held accountable through deadlines prescribed in
statute. Their arguments for the need to overhaul the Clean Air Act
are supported by a 1981 Brookings Institution study undertaken by
Lester Lave and Gilbert Omenn.
The authors use the model of a New Deal agency as the basis for
normative assessment of the Clean Air Act-and the roles of EPA,
Congress, and the courts. The authors consider three distinctive fea-
tures of the New Deal agency to be critical for their comparison.
First, the central New Deal mission is to create a decision making
structure that relies upon the use of various types of expertise rang-
ing from ecology to engineering to economics. Second, the New Deal
agency is insulated from direct political interference. Third, the New
Deal agency is to be insulated from judicial oversight, the role of the
latter being to focus on questions that promise to support the use of
expertise; e.g., did the agency give serious consideration to all relevant
data and arguments, was the decision "arbitrary and capricious?" The
New Deal model that they describe achieved limited success to say the
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least. But this is one of their major points. It is the shortcomings of
the New Deal model that led Congress to make some dramatic
changes in the Clean Air Act.
Using this model of the New Deal agency, Ackerman and Hassler
view the Clean Air Act as an attempt to move beyond the New Deal
in a number of specific ways-these constitute the basis of the
authors' arguments. The major change in the institutional design of
the Clean Air Act from the New Deal model was agency-forcing. Its
objective was to limit the potential for administrative passivity and
"capture" by polluting interests. Ackerman and Hassler argue that
Congress simply chose the wrong model for agency-forcing. Congress
had two alternatives. In the first alternative, characterized by the
authors as "means-oriented" agency-forcing, the agency is told pre-
cisely what regulatory approaches should be taken to reach the Con-
gressional objective. In the second alternative, characterized by the
authors as "ends-oriented" agency-forcing (the model favored by
Ackerman and Hassler), Congress requires the agency to define its
ends aggressively and challenges the agency to select a course that
promises to reach its goals effectively. The authors argue that the
choice of means-oriented agency-forcing required the Congress to in-
dulge in judgments beyond its capacity. In this case the language of
the Clean Air Act encouraged a solution based on what the authors
call the "frontier" drawing board and unproven technology of dry-
scrubbing. The technologically unsophisticated approach of physical
coal washing, with known capability to reduce discharges by 20 to
40% and at much lower cost than full scrubbing, was dismissed. How
the institutional structure led to full scrubbing and why the option
of physical coal washing was never allowed to surface provided the
major contribution of this polemic.
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